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RECENT DECISIONS
being mulcted by the seller 5 and giving the purchaser a ten-day
period in which he can redeem seems to afford sufficient protection.
It is apparent that Section 78 defines the rights of the buyer, by
giving him ten days in which to redeem, and that Section 79 defines
the rights of the seller, giving him the right to sell, if during the
ten-day redemption period the buyer fails to redeem. There is no
provision in either section that notice can be given only after the
lapse of the ten-day period in which the buyer has the right to re-
deem. 6 The redemption period and the ten-day notice of resale may
overlap. 7  If a seller wishes to advertise a public auction of the re-
possessed goods, he knows that such sale is subject to the purchaser's
right of redemption. If the seller wishes to expend the necessary
time and money in advertising a public auction to be held at the ex-
piration of the redemption period, such action is not inconsistent with
the purpose of the law. The purchaser is granted a ten-day period
of redemption, and allowing this ten-day period to run concurrently
with the ten-day period of notice does not defeat the purpose of the
law, or in any way destroy the right of the purchaser to redeem, or
the seller to sell at public auction.
G. H. M.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONFLICT OF LAWS--FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT-STOcKHOLDERS' DOUBLE LIABILIT.-Plaintiff, as statutory
liquidator of the Bank of the United States, a New York corpora-
tion, sought to recover in the New Jersey state courts unpaid assess-
ments levied against defendant stockholders who are residents of New
Jersey, pursuant to law.' By way of defense, the defendant, one of
the stockholders, pleaded a New Jersey statute 2 under which plaintiff
would have to bring an action in equity, naming all depositors, stock-
holders and creditors of the bank parties to the action. Plaintiff
claimed that to sustain the defense would violate the full faith and
credit clause of the Federal Constitution.3  The trial court sustained
the motion to strike out the complaint, 4 on the ground that the statute
Petze v. Waters, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1000 (App. T. 2d Dept. 1917).
6 Commercial Credit Corporation v. Goldberg, 130 Misc. 597, 224 N. Y.
Supp. 177 (1927).
"Ibid.; Freeman v. Engle, Strickland v. Hare and Chase, Incorporated,
both supra note 3.
'N. Y. CoNsT., art. VIII, §7; N. Y. BANKING LAW (1909) §§80, 120.22 Comp. St. N. J. (1910) p. 1656, §94b; see 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) §1868 for a discussion of this section.
'U. S. CosT., Art. IV, §1 provides, "that full faith and credit shall be
given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state."
'Broderick v. Abrams, et al., 112 N. J. L. 309, 170 Atl. 214 (1934), aff'd,
113 N. J. L. 305, 174 Atl. 507 (1934).
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of New Jersey constituted a bar to plaintiff's action. The judgment
was affirmed by the appellate court. 5  Plaintiff appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Held, reversed. The power
of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and
the character of the controversies which shall be heard therein is
subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution.
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589 (1935).
Whether the courts of one state will enforce the liability of a
stockholder of a corporation created in another state depends entirely
upon the comity of the former.6 A state cannot escape its constitu-
tional obligations (under the full faith and credit clause),7 by the
simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to courts other-
wise competent.8 A state can legislate only with reference to its own
jurisdiction 9 and the full faith and credit clause does not require the
enforcement of every right which has ripened into a judgment of
another state or has been conferred by its statutes.' 0 The statutory
liability 1 sought to be enforced is contractual 12 and not penal.' 8
The assessment is an incident of the incorporation. A corporation is
subject to the regulatory power of the state of incorporation, so
much so, that no other state can be said to have any public policy
thereon. In respect to the determination of liability for an assess-
ment, 14 the New Jersey stockholders submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of New York. For, "the act of becoming a member (of
a corporation) is something more than a contract, it is entering into
a complex and abiding relation, and as marriage looks to domicil,
5Ibid.
Whitman v. National Bank, 176 U. S. 560, 20 Sup. Ct. 477 (1900).
'U. S. CONST., Art. IV, §1, supra note 3; Note, 74 A. L. R. 711;
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 155, 52 Sup. Ct. 571(1932). "Statutes are 'public acts' within the meaning of this clause."
8Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371 (1920);
Fauntelroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 (1908). Under the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution the states of the Union must enforce
a valid money judgment of a sister state even though it would have been
contrary to the public policy of the forum to allow action on the original claim.
9 Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (1881).
10 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 160, 52 Sup. Ct.
571 (1932); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294
U. S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518 (1935).
"N. Y. CoNST., art. VIII, §7; N. Y. BANKING LAW (1909) §§80, 120;
Broderick v. Adamson, 148 Misc. 353, 265 N. Y. Supp. 804 (1933).
'Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 56 N. E. 888 (1900); Howarth v.
Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 187, 56 N. E. 489 (1900). Cmttra: Van Tuyl v. Carpen-
ter, 135 Tenn. 629, 188 S. W. 234 (1916).
"Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 (1892); Barth v.
Pock, 51 Mont. 418, 155 Pac. 282 (1915) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS(1934) §611.
" Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 260, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (1912).
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membership looks to and must be governed by the law of the State
granting the incorporation." 15
It is well settled that a receiver, in the absence of a statutory
provision vesting him with rights as quasi-assignee or representative
of creditors, has no power as of right to sue in the courts of a juris-
diction foreign to his appointment,16 because he is considered merely
as an arm or officer of the court which appoints him. The Superin-
tendent of Banks is not an officer of any court, but is an administra-
tive officer of the state 17 and in liquidation proceedings of any bank
the corporate property and claims vest in him.' 8  Where, however,
the rights of a receiver do not rest merely upon his appointment by
the court of another state, but there has been an assignment to him,
in his official capacity, of the property in question, or, by virtue of
the statute of such state, the title to the property is vested in him, he
may sue and recover the same, not strictly by virtue of his appoint-
ment, but by reason of his title as an assignee.19
M. B. G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY AcT.-The defendants are slaughterhouse
operators in Brooklyn. They buy most of their poultry at the freight
depots in New York City, although on a few occasions they have
made purchases directly from commission men in Philadelphia. The
chickens are slaughtered immediately and sold to retailers for local
consumption. The Attorney-General secured the indictment of these
defendants for violations of the "Live Poultry Code,"' and they
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 69 L. ed. 783, 45
Sup. Ct. 389 (1925) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 865-882; RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §187.
16 Booth v. Clark, 58 U. S. 322 (1854) ; Sterrett v. Second National Bank,
248 U. S. 73, 76, 39* Sup. Ct. 27 (1915).
1 N. Y. BANKING LAW (1909) §80; Broderick v. McGuire, 119 Conn. 83,
101, 174 AtI. 314, 94 A. L. R. 890 (1935); Van Tuyl v. Lewis, 165 App. Div.
412, 150 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1st Deot. 1914); Van Tuyl v. Schwab, 165 App.
Div. 412, 150 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1st Dept. 1914). In enforcing the stockholder's
individual liability, the Superintendent of Banks acts on behalf of the creditors
and not in any sense on behalf of the bank itself.
'Isaac v. Marcus, et al., 258 N. Y. 257, 263, 179 N. E. 487 (1932).
" Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 257, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (1912) ; Selig
v. Hamilton, 234 U. S. 652. 34 Sup. Ct. 926 (1914) ; Bullock v. Oliver, 155
Ga. 151, 116 S. E. 293 (1922); Broderick v. Stephano, 314 Pa. 408, 171 AtI.
582 (1934); Broderick v. McGuire, supra note 17, the court said. "that the
Superintendent of Banks is just as much a quasi or statutory assignee of the
right to enforce the obligations of stockholders as is a receiver seeking to
enforce a similar obligation."
1 "Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metro-
politan Area in and About the City of New York," approved by executive
1935]
